Courts enter these orders in appropriate cases for the purpose of rotection or support of the family, to maintain the status quo pending the final resolution, to revent the unreasonable and inequitable loss or destruction of property, or to serve other purposes ecessary to do justice in the administration of its duties.

In Colorado, temporary orders are addressed in 14-10-108.  Under this section, the court may consider the allocation of parental responsibilities in accordance with the best interests of the child, with particular reference to the factors specified in section 14-10-124.  Since temporary orders may be entered early in the divorce proceedings, it is important to retain representation as soon as you are served divorce papers.

The Colorado Supreme Court recently decided a case involving an allegedly drunk driver, Arnold Wehmas, who hit a parked car in the parking lot of his apartment complex, and went to his apartment without exchanging information with the owner of the car he hit. The charges included the misdemeanor offenses of DUI and leaving the scene after striking an unattended motor vehicle ("hit and run"). Because the arresting officers entered Wehmas's apartment without obtaining a warrant, he moved to suppress all evidence that was obtained as a result of the warrantless entry.  

A trained attorney will spot the issue of whether a warrantless entry into Wehmas's apartment violated his rights to be free of unreasonable searches.  To preserve your rights, you have to make the proper objections and motions before the trial court.  A pro se plaintiff may not be aware of the rights that he is signing away by not hiring a competent attorney to handle his case.

In Wehmas's case, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression ruling on the ground that the officers acted unreasonably under these circumstances in entering the defendant's home without first obtaining a warrant. 

Well, it appears that you shouldn't have a spring in your step if you want to file a 1983 suit claiming a 4th amendment violation from an unlawful seizure.  According to the opinion:

...as we explained in Bella, Hodari indicates no seizure can occur unless there is physical touch or a show of authority. But, as other Supreme Court precedent further instructs, such physical touch (or force) must terminate the suspect's movement, and, alternatively, any show of authority (without touch) must cause submission. Nothing in our reading of the statements in Hodari or Bella or their holdings causes us to believe that in flight situations mere intentional physical touch constitutes a seizure, absent termination of the suspect's movement. As the district court in the instant case stated, “the plain meaning of the word seizure and various Supreme Court interpretations indicate that the government must do something that gives it the opportunity to control the suspect's ability to evade capture or control.” Apt.App. at 19. Unfortunately but understandably, Hodari and our general discussion in Bella have been incorrectly interpreted by Mr. Brooks to mean his shooting alone constitutes a seizure, without consideration of the fact he continued to flee without the deputies' acquisition of physical control, as demonstrated by the fact he remained at large for days.

The Court repeatedly noted that Brooks remained 'at large for days' and had a 'spring in his step' despite being shot.  The Court does acknowledge that the 11th Circuit had a different take on whether being shot by the police is sufficient to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the 4th but argues that the 11th is relying on dicta in Hodari:

We further note the Eleventh Circuit applied the same dicta to conclude a bullet striking a suspect constituted a seizure, even though he was not stopped by the bullet but continued to flee by running to his house. See Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.2003).

So it appears that, at least in the 10th Circuit, if you are shot by the cops you should ... um... terminate your movement.  The opinion.